A specific brain structural basis for individual differences in reality monitoring.

Much recent interest has centered on understanding the relationship between brain structure variability and individual differences in cognition, but there has been little progress in identifying specific neuroanatomical bases of such individual differences. One cognitive ability that exhibits considerable variability in the healthy population is reality monitoring; the cognitive processes used to introspectively judge whether a memory came from an internal or external source (e.g., whether an event was imagined or actually occurred). Neuroimaging research has implicated the medial anterior prefrontal cortex (PFC) in reality monitoring, and here we sought to determine whether morphological variability in a specific anteromedial PFC brain structure, the paracingulate sulcus (PCS), might underlie performance. Fifty-three healthy volunteers were selected on the basis of MRI scans and classified into four groups according to presence or absence of the PCS in their left or right hemisphere. The group with absence of the PCS in both hemispheres showed significantly reduced reality monitoring performance and ability to introspect metacognitively about their performance when compared with other participants. Consistent with the prediction that sulcal absence might mean greater volume in the surrounding frontal gyri, voxel-based morphometry revealed a significant negative correlation between anterior PFC gray matter and reality monitoring performance. The findings provide evidence that individual differences in introspective abilities like reality monitoring may be associated with specific structural variability in the PFC

Suppressing Unwanted Autobiographical Memories Reduces Their Automatic Influences: Evidence from Electrophysiology and an Implicit Autobiographical Memory Test

The present study investigated the extent to which people can suppress unwanted autobiographical memories in a mock crime memory detection context. Participants encoded sensorimotor-rich memories by enacting a lab crime (stealing a ring) and received direct suppression instructions so as to evade guilt detection in a brainwave-based concealed information test. Aftereffects of suppression on automatic memory processes were measured in an autobiographical implicit association test (aIAT). Results showed that suppression attenuated brainwave activity (P300) that is associated with crime-relevant memory retrieval, rendering innocent and guilty/suppression participants indistinguishable. However, guilty/suppression and innocent participants could nevertheless be discriminated via the late posterior negative slow wave, which may reflect the need to monitor response conflict arising between voluntary suppression and automatic recognition processes. Lastly, extending recent findings that suppression can impair implicit memory processes; we provide novel evidence that suppression reduces automatic cognitive biases that are otherwise associated with actual autobiographical memories

Intact strategic retrieval processes in older adults: No evidence for age-related deficits in source-constrained retrieval

Aging is thought to involve impairments to cognitive control functions that support episodic memory, for example by enabling people to strategically constrain their retrieval search towards a specific context (“source”) in order to facilitate retrieval of goal-relevant memories. The “memory-for-foils” paradigm investigates source-constrained retrieval by assessing whether incidental encoding of new foils during an old/new recognition test differs depending on the type of processing that was previously used during study of the old items in the test. If it does, it suggests that people process foils differently as a result of engaging in source-constrained retrieval attempts. Young adults typically show differences in incidental encoding foils, but such differences have not been found in older adults. Here, we compared source-constrained retrieval and reward effects on incidental foil encoding between younger and older adults, to assess if age-related reductions in strategic retrieval processing are accompanied by differences in responsiveness to external rewards. The results showed only minor effects of rewards on memory processing, in younger adults only. Contrary to prior findings, older adults had equivalent overall memory performance and spontaneously constrained retrieval to the same extent as the young group, showing that aging-related impairments to strategic retrieval processes are not inevitable

Unintentional and intentional recognition rely on dissociable neurocognitive mechanisms

Distractibility can lead to accidents and academic failures, as well as memory problems. Recent evidence suggests that intentional recognition memory can be biased by unintentional recognition of distracting stimuli in the same environment. It is unknown whether unintentional and intentional recognition depend on the same underlying neurocognitive mechanisms. We assessed whether human participants’ recognition of previously seen (old) or not seen (new) target stimuli was affected by whether a to-be-ignored distractor was old or new. ERPs were recorded to investigate the neural correlates of this bias. The results showed that the old/new status of salient distractors had a biasing effect on target recognition accuracy. Both intentional and unintentional recognition elicited early ERP effects that are thought to reflect relatively automatic memory processes. However, only intentional recognition elicited the later ERP marker of conscious recollection, consistent with previous suggestions that recollection is under voluntary control. In contrast, unintentional recognition was associated with an enhanced late posterior negativity, which may reflect monitoring or evaluation of memory signals. The findings suggest that unintentional and intentional recognition involve dissociable memory processes

Imagining a false alibi impairs concealed memory detection with the autobiographical Implicit Association Test

Imagining counterfactual versions of past events can distort memory. In three experiments, we examined whether imagining a false alibi for a mock crime would make suspects appear less guilty in a concealed memory detection test, the autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT), which aims to determine which of two autobiographical events are true. First, “guilty” participants completed a mock crime, whereas “innocent” participants completed an innocent act. Next, some of the guilty participants were asked to imagine a false alibi that corresponded to the innocent act. Finally, all groups completed the aIAT. Across experiments, we varied the type of aIAT used and also compared the effectiveness of the false alibi countermeasure when only imagined once, versus when it was repeatedly imagined over a week long period. The aIAT accurately detected the mock crime as true for guilty participants without a false alibi, but was consistently less able to detect the mock crime as true for guilty participants who had imagined a false alibi. The findings suggest that if guilty suspects fabricate an alibi, this may create a memory for the alibi that appears to be true based on the aIAT, which is problematic for its real-life applications in concealed memory detection

Goal-directed mechanisms that constrain retrieval predict subsequent memory for new "foil" information.

To remember a previous event, it is often helpful to use goal-directed control processes to constrain what comes to mind during retrieval. Behavioral studies have demonstrated that incidental learning of new "foil" words in a recognition test is superior if the participant is trying to remember studied items that were semantically encoded compared to items that were non-semantically encoded. Here, we applied subsequent memory analysis to fMRI data to understand the neural mechanisms underlying the "foil effect". Participants encoded information during deep semantic and shallow non-semantic tasks and were tested in a subsequent blocked memory task to examine how orienting retrieval towards different types of information influences the incidental encoding of new words presented as foils during the memory test phase. To assess memory for foils, participants performed a further surprise old/new recognition test involving foil words that were encountered during the previous memory test blocks as well as completely new words. Subsequent memory effects, distinguishing successful versus unsuccessful incidental encoding of foils, were observed in regions that included the left inferior frontal gyrus and posterior parietal cortex. The left inferior frontal gyrus exhibited disproportionately larger subsequent memory effects for semantic than non-semantic foils, and significant overlap in activity during semantic, but not non-semantic, initial encoding and foil encoding. The results suggest that orienting retrieval towards different types of foils involves re-implementing the neurocognitive processes that were involved during initial encoding.James S. McDonnell Foundation (Scholar Award), Medical Research Council, Wellcome TrustThis is the final version of the article. It first appeared from Elsevier via http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2016.07.01

Suppressing Unwanted Memories Reduces Their Unintended Influences

The ability to control unwanted memories is critical for maintaining cognitive function and mental health. Prior research has shown that suppressing the retrieval of unwanted memories impairs their retention, as measured on intentional (direct) memory tests. Here we review emerging evidence revealing that retrieval suppression can also reduce the unintended influence of suppressed traces. In particular, retrieval suppression (1) gradually diminishes the tendency for memories to intrude into awareness, and (2) reduces memories’ unintended expressions on indirect memory tests. We present a neural account in which, during suppression, retrieval cues elicit hippocampally-triggered neocortical activity that briefly reinstates features of the original event, which, in turn, are suppressed by targeted neocortical and hippocampal inhibition. This reactivation-dependent reinstatement principle could provide a broad mechanism by which suppressing retrieval of intrusive memories limits their indirect influences

Distraction by unintentional recognition: Neurocognitive mechanisms and effects of aging

Sometimes, we intentionally evaluate stimuli to assess if we recognise them, whereas other times, stimuli automatically elicit recognition despite our efforts to ignore them. If multiple stimuli are encountered in the same environment, intentional recognition judgements can be biased by unintentional recognition of to-be-ignored stimuli. Aging is associated with increased distractibility and impaired intentional retrieval processes, which can make older adults more susceptible to distraction-induced recognition biases. We measured recognition memory performance, ERPs and EEG oscillations in old (60-74) and young (18-24) adults to investigate how aging affects unintentional and intentional memory processes, and how these processes interact over time to produce distraction-induced recognition biases. Older participants had poorer intentional recognition memory, but the biasing effect of unintentional distractor recognition was similar across age groups. ERP effects related to intentional and unintentional recognition that were strongly expressed in the younger group were reduced or absent in the older group. Furthermore, the older group showed qualitatively different ERP activity during intentional recognition compared to the younger group. However, similar patterns of theta and alpha oscillations were found in both age groups, who showed theta power increases for both intentional and unintentional recognition, whereas alpha power was enhanced for intentional recognition but reduced for unintentional recognition. Overall, the findings show that unintentional and intentional recognition involve multiple dissociable memory processes that have different time-courses and functional characteristics, and are differentially affected by aging. Whereas aging has strong effects on the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying intentional recognition memory, unintentional recognition mechanisms are less affected

Changing minds about minds: Evidence that people are too sceptical about animal sentience

Our relationships with other animals are governed by how we view their capacity for sentience and suffering. However, there is currently little agreement as to whether people's beliefs about animal minds are largely accurate or inaccurate. We used an innovative task to examine how people update their beliefs in response to noisy but informative clues about animal minds. This allowed us to compare participants' posterior beliefs to what a normative participant ought to believe if they conform to Bayes' theorem. Five studies (four pre-registered; n = 2417) found that participants shifted their beliefs too far in response to clues that suggested animals do not have minds (i.e., overshooting what a normative participant ought to believe), but not far enough in response to clues that suggested animals have minds (i.e., falling short of what a normative participant ought to believe). A final study demonstrated that this effect was attenuated when humans were the targets of belief. The findings demonstrate that people underestimate animal minds in a way that can be said to be inaccurate and highlight the role of belief updating in downplaying evidence of animal minds. The findings are discussed in relation to speciesist beliefs about the supremacy of humans over animals

Are we smart enough to remember how smart animals are?

Some theoretical perspectives suggest people overestimate animals’ mental capacities (anthropomorphism), while others suggest they underestimate them (mind-denial). However, studies have generally not employed objective criteria against which the accuracy or appropriateness of people’s judgements about animals can be tested. We employed memory paradigms, in which judgments are clearly right or wrong, in 9 experiments (8 pre-registered; n = 3162). When tested shortly after exposure, meat-eaters’ memory about companion-animals (e.g., dogs) but not food-animals (e.g., pigs) showed an anthropomorphic bias: more information consistent with animals having vs. lacking a mind was correctly remembered (Experiments 1-4). Vegetarians and vegans memory, on the other hand, consistently showed an anthropomorphic bias regarding food and companion animals alike (Experiments 5 and 6). When tested a week after exposure, both those who eat meat and those who do not showed signs of shifting toward a mind-denying bias (Experiments 2, 3, and 6). These biases had important consequences for beliefs about animal minds. Inducing mind-denying memory biases caused participants to see animals as possessing less sophisticated minds (Experiments 7-9). The work demonstrates that judgments about animals’ minds can depart predictably from reality and that such departures can contribute to biased perceptions of their minds